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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
1. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The only case before the Supreme Court of South Carolina involv-
ing this most important of all threshold problems was State v. Life
Insurance Co. of Georgia' involving an action by the state against a
foreign insurance company, seeking to recover outstanding license fees
allegedly due. The issue presented was in the case of two applicable
statutes of limitation, which statute applied? The court held that
"[W]here there is any doubt as to which of two statutes of limitation
applies, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the longer period."
2
The defendant insurance company denied the amounts allegedly
due for five years between 1958 and 1965 while admitting that certain
license fees were due for 1958 and 1961. They grounded their defense,
however, upon the statute of limitations, arguing that the six year
statute of limitation applied as to actions created by statute.3 The court
disagreed with this contention, however, preferring to adopt the longer
ten year provision.4 Accordingly, the court, speaking through Asso-
ciate Justice Bussey, stated that such "specific applicable limitation
removes the instant case from the application of the ordinary period
of limitation applicable to actions upon other liabilities created by
statute." 5
II. JURISDICTION AND PROCESS
The cases grouped in this threshold area dealt with some vital
issues of jurisdiction with at least one case setting forth a new trend at
the federal district court level.
The first case, Edwards v. Edwards' involved a divorce action. The
husband-appellant proposed a transfer of realty to his wife in exchange
for a scheme of decreased support payments. Thereafter, the appellant
1. 254 S.C. 286, 175 S.E.2d 203 (1970).
2. Id. at 299, 175 S.E.2d at 209; accord, Scovill v. Johnson, 190 S.C. 457, 3 S.E.2d
543 (1939).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-143 (1962).
4. § 65-2707 (1962) provides in relevant part: "The State may bring suit in court
for back taxes at any time within ten years from the date when they should have been
paid ....
5. 254 S.C. 299, 175 S.E.2d at 209.
6. 254 S.C. 466, 176 S.E.2d 123 (1970).
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challenged the jurisdiction of the court to order such a transfer on the
grounds that the court had no subject matter jurisdiction.
The court, speaking through Associate Justice Lewis, found that
because the appellant not only proposed the transfer, but further had
not refused the benefits accruing to him as a result thereof, he was
estopped from challenging the power of the court to authorize the
transfer on any grounds. This decision by the court was forthcoming
even in the countenance of appellant's further contention that the prin-
ciple of estoppel did not relate to subject matter jurisdiction. In dealing
with this argument, the court felt the estoppel was effective regardless,
as jurisdiction was not realized via the estoppel but rather the appellant
was estopped from asserting his challenge via his acquiescence to his
own proposal. Ergo, it seems apparent that this decision should not be
read too broadly.
The second case to fall with the scope of jurisdiction, O'Neill's
Estate v. TourneyJ involved an estate administration proceeding. The
decedent, who entered the Navy in 1917, was rendered mentally incom-
petent during his term of service. He was released from the Navy in
1919 and died in 1968 in Charleston County, South Carolina. The
deceased left a will and the instant proceeding was instituted in the
Probate Court for Sumter County, the official residence of the de-
ceased when he entered the Navy. Appellants, the sole heirs at law had
deceased died intestate, interposed objection to the jurisdiction of the
Probate Court of Sumter County on the grounds that it was not in
compliance with the statutory requirements.8 Moreover, appellants re-
quested a jury trial so as to settle the controversy of the decedents
residency for purposes of establishing jurisdiction.
Appellants conceded that jurisdiction should be established where
the deceased lived upon his entry into military service as he was incapa-
citated between the dismissal and his death. The supreme court agreed
with the decision of the probate court stating two principles: first, that
the domicile of an individual in military service remains constant at the
place where he entered the service and secondly that an adult who
becomes insane retains the domicile he had when he became insane.
7. 254 S.C. 578, 176 S.E.2d 527 (1970).
8. Under the provisions of § 19-401 of the 1962 Code of Laws, the estate of the
deceased must be administered in the county in which he was "last an inhabitant."
1971]
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The court further found that it was in the discretion of the circuit
court to allow a jury determination of the oustanding factual issue as
to last residency. And as a mere discretionary prerogative, refusal to
allow a jury to be empanelled for such purpose was not an abuse of
discretion regardless of the importance of the issue to be decided.'
Finally, the high court stood firmly upon the legal adage that the
findings of a lower court will not be disturbed absent a clearly and
manifestly erroneous decision.
The third case in this area presented the following question: Does
the duty to defend and limit an insured's liability contained in the
policy of liability insurance constitute a "debt" owed the policyholder
which is subject to attachment, thereby conferring jurisdiction upon the
courts of South Carolina? The court, in Howard v. Allen,10 responded
in the negative and found for the defendant policyholder. In settling this
controversy, the court concluded that the aforementioned duty did not
constitute a debt subject to attachment so as to confer jurisdiction, and
that a debt per se did not come about until such time as the insured's
carrier defaulted in its contractual obligation. The court, accordingly,
quashed plaintiff's warrant of attachment deployed solely for purposes
of gaining jurisdiction.
The fourth case to be decided within this area came from the
Federal District Court and is especially noteworthy" because of its
novel decision regarding what was, until now, a reasonably well settled
principle of defeating diversity jurisdiction in federal courts. The case,
Carter v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. 2 involved a tort action
brought by a minor child via has father as guardian ad litem. The
defendant was a corporation chartered and doing most of its business
in Virginia. The plaintiffs, residents of South Carolina, "hired" a
resident of Virginia to act as a party plaintiff and assigned to this
individual 1/100th of the interest in the case. Thereafter, when the
defendants moved to have the case removed to federal court (as the
amount exceeded the minimum jurisdictional requirement and there
was, absent the assigned interest, diversity), the plaintiffs moved to
have the case remanded arguing that there was by virtue of the assign-
ment no diversity.
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-205 (1962).
10. 254 S.C. 455, 176 S.E.2d 127 (1970).
I1. See, Comment, 23 S.C.L. REv. 463 (1971).
12. 318 F. Supp. 368 (D.S.C. 1970).
[Vol. 23
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The federal court, however, subsequent to viewing the testimony
as provided by depositions taken of the minor plaintiffs father and the
assignment plaintiff, decided that the assignment was sham or colora-
ble and did not defeat federal jurisdiction. The court expanded on this
conclusion by stating that the evidence indicated manifestly that the
Virginia resident was joined without consideration on his part, that he
had no determinative position as to the handling of the case and that
he was, in fact, ignorant as to fee arrangements, personal obligations
pertaining to cost, etc. 3
Although the judge in this decision, Judge Russell of the Charles-
ton Division, invited an interlocutory appeal to be taken before the
fourth circuit bench prior to further litigation, the invitation was not
acted upon by the plaintiffs. The motion to remand the case to state
court was denied and the case thereafter remained in the federal court.
11I. PLEADINGS
A. The Complaint
The only case before the supreme court of South Carolina involv-
ing the validity of a complaint was Wallace v. Wallace,4 an action for
an accounting of stock allegedly due the petitioner. The complaint,
filed in Civil Court in Florence County, alleged that the stock in con-
troversy did not exceed $11,000 in value, the maximum jurisdictional
amount allowable in that court. 5 The defendant to the action, the
administrator of the estate and guardian of the stocks in question,
answered admitting to the allegation involving the amount. Not until
the case reached the state supreme court did the defendant challenge
the amount as exceeding the heretofore mentioned limit. The court held
that the defendant had the duty, if he so desired, to object to the amount
allegation at the time of the filing of his answer and his manifest failure
to make such a timely objection amounted to a waiver. 6
13. Id. at 374, where the most significant language appears:
This assignment is manifestly 'colorable' and 'feigned'. The assignee, as
we have already indicated, is an 'employed' assignee. When evidence of an
assignment of this character . . . is added to the admitted purpose of
defeating jurisdiction, the conclusion is inescapable, it appears to this
Court, that the assignment must be disregarded for jurisdictional purposes.
14. 182 S.E.2d 60 (S.C. 1971).
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-162 (1962).
16. 182 S.E.2d at 63. The Court stated: "The uncontested allegation of the com-
plaint as to the value of the stock. . . determined jurisdiction."
1971]
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [1971], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol23/iss4/10
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Another point raised by the Wallace case, pertinent to the area of
pleadings, involves defendant-appellant's attempt to amend his answer
so as to include the defense of estoppel. The court, in denying defen-
dant-appellant's request, stated that the movant knew for more than a
year the facts regarding the defense in question and, accordingly, no
abuse of discretion resulted with either the Master to whom the factual
issues were referred or the trial court judge in refusing to allow the
requested amendment.
The final point the court dealt with in this action regarded appel-
lant's charge that the lower court erred in setting the cause for appeal.
The actions giving rise to this charge involved appellant's attempt to
include a statement of undisputed facts as part of his case and excep-
tions. The respondent refused to accept the statement as undisputed and
the lower court, because of this objection, denied acceptance of the
appellant's statement. Appellant thereafter argued that, according to
the Rules of the Supreme Court, especially Rule 4, Section 4,17 the
Transcript of Record must include a statement of undisputed facts. The
onus, continued appellant's argument, was therefore upon respondent
to object to any offensive inclusions in the proposed statement when
the statement was introduced before the trial court. Such specific objec-
tions would then be decided upon by the court.
The state supreme court concurred with this point holding that the
rule did in fact require a statement of the undisputed facts along with
the recorded testimony of any disputed facts, the purpose being to
eliminate unneeded expense in the printing of undisputed facts. The
court, therefore, sustained the appellant's objection as to this point
reversing the lower court's order setting the case for appeal.
B. Demurrer
This area was one of the more active during the past survey period.
The first case, Pargas of Loris, Inc. v. Heniford,15 involved an oral
demurrer to a counterclaim on the ground that the "counterclaim
doesn't state facts sufficent to constitute the cause of action or a de-
fense."' 9 In a very short opinion, the court here held that the demurrer
17. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 4 § 4 provides in pertinent part: "Undisputed facts must be
stated without the testimony, and only the testimony as to disputed facts shall be stated,
omitting all that is irrelevant to the issues to be decided."
18. 254 S.C. 344, 175 S.E.2d 391 (1970).
19. See, S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-643 (1962).
[Vol. 23
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to the counterclaim did not fail because it was oral, but rather because
it wasn't specific as to the grounds for demurrer. The court, however,
left unanswered whether the demurrer may have been less effective than
a written counterpart.
Two cases heard by the South Carolina Supreme Court reiterated
the above principle, and its application to written demurrers. In
Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v. Ward,2 an action at equity, the
plaintiff railroad sought an injunction against the defendant, adjacent
landowner, for alleged misuse and trespass upon plaintiff's right of
way. The defendant's answer alleged plaintiff's interference with de-
fendant's right of way over the road, denied unlawful trespass and
sought to recover damages for the alleged interference. In rejecting
plaintiff's demurrer to the answer (albeit it was uncertain whether
defendant's answer sufficiently alleged facts constituting one or more
defenses) the court made evident its sentiment that the ends of justice
would better be served by a trial on the merits. Speaking through
Associate Justice Bussey, the court repeated the proposition that
"[p]leadings, for the purpose of demurrer, have to be liberally con-
strued in favor of the pleader and a demurrer cannot be sustained if
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, or a defense, can be
fairly gathered from the pleading, however uncertain, defective or im-
perfect the allegations may be."
' 21
The second case, Lawson v. Citizens and Southern National Bank
of South Carolina,22 mirrored the language of the first, but may be
considered a bit more expansive. The two things the court did point out
here was that the plaintiff need not label his cause of action and that a
complaint must be liberally construed and sustained if not only facts
alleged but inferences reasonably drawn therefrom are present entitling
plaintiff to any relief on any theory of the case, albeit different from
that on which he may have supposed himself entitled to recovery.
In another case involving a demurrer, Galbraith v. City of
Spartanburg,21 the defendant, the City of Spartanburg, instituted con-
demnation proceedings to, in its words, acquire property that was
20. 255 S.C. 127, 177 S.E.2d 479 (1970).
21. Id. at 129, 177 S.E.2d at 479-80; accord, Coral Gables v. Palmetto Brick
Company, 183 S.C. 478, 191 S.E. 337 (1937).
22. 180 S.E.2d 206 (S.C. 1971).
23. 255 S.C. 380, 179 S.E.2d 37 (1971).
19711
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"immediately necessary for highway purposes. This proceeding was
settled and more than two years thereafter, the plaintiff herein, one of
the landowners directly affected by the condemnation, commenced the
instant action alleging that (1) the condemnation proceeding (already
settled) was wholly premature and far in advance of proper timeliness
and that (2) this unreasonable delay in demolition deprived plaintiffs
of the benefits accrued from the use of their land which had remained
vacant for more than two years.
The defendants demurred as to both points, and the Common
Pleas Court of Spartanburg, Judge Badger Baker presiding, sustained
the demurrer as to the first cause of action. Judge Baker found that
the complaint actually requested the court to set aside the previous
judgment (the settlement) without benefit of a formal request to set
aside that judgment.25 Consequently, the Common Pleas court held
that the settlement was tantamount to a judgment and that such judg-
ment, regular on its face, was immune from attack, except when fraud
or lack of jurisdiction come to light.26 The Supreme Court, upon ap-
peal, upheld, per curiam, the lower court decision and printed Judge
Baker's order in the opinion.
In overruling the demurrer as to he second cause of action, the
Common Pleas Court of Spartanburg held that the alleged deprivation
of benefits was, in fact, a sufficiently stated cause of action and that it
was, accordingly, not demurrable, but must be considered upon the
merits. This matter was not appealed to the Supreme Court.
The final case involving a demurrer, Berry v. Lindsay," involved
a proceeding against the state Chief Insurance Commissioner to obtain
a Writ of Prohibition "restraining the issuance of additional rate in-
creases for automobile liability insurance so long as the insurance in-
dustry as a whole is showing a profit." z The proceeding was a class
24. Id. at 381, 179 S.E.2d at 38.
25. Id. at 382, 179 S.E.2d at 39. As the court stated this point: "What plaintiffs
are now seeking is a determination of necessity of acquisition through review of a judg-
ment which they have not asked to set aside. An attack is made thereon for the purpose
of obtaining additional compensation or an unlawful and premature condemnation."
26. Id. at 382, 179 S.E.2d at 39. The court emphasized the point by stating:
A litigant is barred from raising any issues which were adjudicated in the
former suit and any issues which might have been raised in the former
action. Any question of necessity could have been determined in the origi-
nal action.
27. 182 S.E.2d 78 (S.C. 1971).
28. Id. at 79. For more specifics as to the substantive issues in this case, see the
article Insurance, 1971 Survey of S.C. Law, elsewhere in this Survey Issue.
[Vol. 23
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action. The defendant-respondent demurred to the complaint on the
grounds that (1) it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action; (2) there was a defect of parties and finally (3) there was a
lack of jurisdiction in the Richland County Court.
The primary issue centered around the request for a Writ of Prohi-
bition as the device to thwart the Commissioner in his anticipated rate
increase. In deciding the case, the supreme court adopted the opinion
of Judge Mason from the lower court. Judge Mason's order traced
carefully the history and purpose of the Writ of Prohibition concluding
that it was not, in fact, usable in situations not involving a judicial
function; the argument here being that the rate increase determination
was an administrative function. Also as to the Writ, the plaintiffs had
alleged an abuse of discretion on part of the Commissioner which, as
stated in the demurrer and as sustained by the trial court, was likewise
an improper foundation for the Writ.
The defendant further argued that the Writ did not lie as the
plaintiffs had available to them an adequate remedy within the state
Code of Laws.29 In opposing the demurrer, petitioner's counsel argued
that the case involved a novel legal issue and ought not be decided on
demurrer and that, further, the demurrer admitted, by way of a preg-
nant negative, the allegations of "quasi-judicial" function and "inade-
quate remedy."
Judge Mason, in refuting this argument, cited the recent case of
Vickers v. Vickers,"° in which the supreme court held that a demurrer
does not admit the inferences, either factual or legal, drawn by a party
in the pleading under attack, but is for the court to determine whether
such inferences are justified. With this statement as a foundation, Judge
Mason took the view that the demurrer did not admit the allegations
as contended by petitioner, but that the only issue was whether the Writ
would lie to pr9hibit respondent from approving such an increase.
As alluded to previously, the Richland County Court judge found
conclusively that the Writ did not lie as the job of rate making is at
best a legislative function and therefore not subject to the Writ of
Prohibition, a document aimed and prosecuted for the restraint of the
judiciary.
29. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 37-701, 37-70 to 74 and 46-719 (1962).
30. 255 S.C. 25, 176 S.E.2d 561 (1970).
1971]
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IV. JOINDER
In the only case pertinent to this subject, Whitney Trading Cor-
poration v. McNair,31 the court consolidated two cases involving viola-
tion of "Sunday Closing Laws. ' 3 In this case, an injunction against
the corporate operator of a large store was properly granted, concluded
the state supreme court, notwithstanding the fact that several depart-
ments of the store were sublet. Consolidation of this case with one
involving the operator of a separate department was not improper
where evidence indicated that the corporate operator retained and oper-
ated several departments of the large store complex himself while also
determining the store hours, store policy, and especially whether the
store would be open for business on Sunday and what items would be
sold on that day. Further, the two cases presented identical issues.
V. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
The first case in this category, City of Greenville v. Bozeman,"
had to do with an action seeking a declaration as to the validity of an
agreement between the City of Greenville and a bank. The con-
troverted agreement provided for the redevelopment of a certain three
block area in downtown Greenville. The supreme court held that there
had been a proper hearing on the redevelopment issue and that the
circuit court had had both subject matter and personal jurisdiction.
This was true because the defendants were previous or current owners
of property either in the project area or abutting the area on a street
at the commencement of the action. Of further importance was the fact
that one defendant was a non-contiguous landowner representing the
interests of all members of that class.
The second case, Power v. McNair,-" was an action for a declara-
tory judgment brought for the purpose of determining whether holding
the offices of city policeman and state constable simultaneously, of-
fended the dual officeholder provision of Article 2, Section 2 of the
South Carolina Constitution. The supreme court found no justiciable
controversy and dismissed the appeal.
The plaintiffs in this action requested appointment as state con-
31. 255 S.C. 8, 176 S.E.2d 572 (1970).
32. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 64-2 to 25 (Supp. 1970).
33. 254 S.C. 306, 175 S.E.2d 211 (1970).
34. 255 S.C. 150, 177 S.E.2d 551 (1970).
[Vol. 23
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stables in accordance with South Carolina Code Section 53-3 to en-
large their jurisdiction thereby enabling them to venture outside the city
limits of Laurens to investigate crimes and apprehend criminals. The
plaintiffs were the chief of police and city patrolman of Laurens who
could not, as part of their authority, venture outside the city limits in
the furtherance of crime control.
Prior to the commencement of the suit, the plaintiffs sought gub-
ernatorial approval for their appointments, but had failed when the
Governor revealed feelings of doubt concerning the constitutionality of
such an appointment. Consequently, this action was brought. The
court, by its own motion, thereafter raised the issue of whether a justici-
able issue was realized via the complaint, it being the law that a declar-
atory judgment cannot be granted absent a requisite dispute.
In reply to this motion, the court held that su fficient issue had not
been raised as a result of plaintiff's attempt to merely gain an advisory
opinion. While the court did recognize that the remedy of a declaratory
judgment did, in fact, live in South Carolina,3 it also realized that a
justiciable controversy is a prerequisite to the deployment of the de-
claratory judgment."6
In the only other case seeking a declaratory judgment that even-
tually was presented to the South Carolina Supreme Court, Notios
Corporation v. HanveyY plaintiff had moved for a declaratory judg-
ment involving certain interests in land. The facts were that plaintiff
and defendant owned adjoining lots in downtown Charleston, each
owning a building on his respective lot, and each building sharing a
common wall with the other. Plaintiff had long since decided, because
of delapidation, to tear his building down, and while he did not know
the exact boundaries of the common wall, he was more than willing to
deed same to the defendant so long as the defendant would shore up
the wall. The defendant, however, refused to enter and shore up the
common wall albeit delay in so doing created a constant danger to the
residents of the remaining building as well as the general public.
Plaintiff, thereafter, sought a declaratory order that he was not
35. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2001 (1962).
36. By the S.C. Supreme Court for definitions of justiciable controversy see Gui-
main & Doan v. Georgetown Textile & Mfg. Co., 249 S.C. 561, 155 S.E.2d 618 (1967);
Dantzler v. Callison, 227 S.C. 317, 88 S.E.2d 64, 65 (1955).
37. 182 S.E.2d 55 (S.C. 1971).
1971]
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responsible for the security of the wall and that he had the right to
complete the demolition with all future responsibility for the wall lying
with the defendant. The defendant demurred to the complaint alleging
that no justiciable controversy was presented, that no concrete issues
either as a legal right in plaintiff or a legal duty in defendant were
present, and that plaintiff sought the declaratory judgment as a vehicle
to require the defendant to share expenses in a project initiated soley
by the plaintiff.
The trial court sustained the demurrer on the grounds that even
though a controversy was presented, the granting of declaratory judg-
ment would render unanswered many other potential issues. Upon ap-
peal to the state supreme court, the trial court's decision was reversed
based on the belief by the higher court that while the contention of the
lower court would be valid per se, the granting of the declaratory
judgment would not prevent these questions from being presented later.
The supreme court would not accept defendant's contentions that the
plaintiff was seeking an advisory opinion and thereupon held that a
justiciable issue is any issue which is appropriate for judicial determina-
tion concluding that, inter alia, the instant case easily fell within this
gamut.
In dealing with the lower court's contention that the declaratory
judgment was blind to later issues, the supreme court stated that the
relief sought was not at all improper and, in fact, neatly terminated the
uncertainty giving rise to the proceeding."'
The last case in this area, Johnson v. Tamsberg,3 is a Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals decision regarding administrative procedures
in the eviction of tenants in a public housing project. The case was a
class action by certain public housing tenants challenging the adminis-
trative procedures by which city houing authority officials in Charles-
ton decided to remove a certain tenant from her premises. The justifica-
tions for the attempted eviction were allegations of vandalism and
destruction of property by the tenant's minor children.
38. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2007 (1962), provides in relevant part:
When declaratory judgment may be refused.-The court may refuse to
render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree when such judgment or
decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or
controversy giving rise to the proceeding.
39. 430 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. 1970).
[Vol. 23
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The defendant, director of the Housing Authority of the City of
Charleston, notified plaintiff-tenant that he had received the aforemen-
tioned complaints of vandalism and that as a result, she would have to
vacate her premises. This notification was informally made over the
telephone. Forty-eight hours later, the defendant sent a notice to plain-
tiff to officially terminate and vacate her premises under threat of
dispossession. The plaintiff thereafter caused a federal suit to be
brought; the defendant countered the next day by instituting eviction
proceedings against her in state court. The state proceeding was heard
and when the defendant-tenant in this case (the plaintiff-tenant in the
federal action) failed to deny the Housing Authority charges (coupled
with her counsel's stipulation as to the factual issues) the judge directed
a verdict for the landlord-plaintiff.
Upon completion of the state suit, the proceedings in the federal
court commenced. The district court judge took notice of the previous
state action and found that plaintiff had been afforded full opportunity
to contest the factual basis for eviction. Accordingly, the district court
held that the claim of denial of a previous, administrative evidentiary
hearing was insubstantial.
In affirming the district court's decision, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals, via Circuit Court Judge Sobeloff, stated that the plaintiff
had, in fact, by way of the state court hearing, been afforded the basic
due process requisites and was not ejected until after these requisites
had been satisfied." Accordingly, the fourth circuit denied plaintiff's
request for a declaratory judgment and injunction against the Director
of the Charleston Housing Authority.
V. TRIAL
In the first case, South Carolina Highway Department v.
Wilson,4 the appeal was grounded upon an abuse of discretion charge
resulting from the trial court judge allowing into evidence certain dis-
putable testimony. The specific abuse of discretion charge came from
the court's permission to admit into evidence the testimony of former
property owners regarding the price of land in a condemnation case.
40. Id. at 1127. As the court stated: "Any substantial due process grievance that
plaintiff might have had when she iled her complaint was mooted by the plenary hearing
that she was afforded."
41. 254 S.C. 360, 175 S.E.2d 391 (1970).
1971]
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The testimony in question went to the issue of land prices in the con-
demnation area in 1959, the staleness of these prices being the main
point of contention by the movants. The court felt, however, that be-
cause none of the witnesses had been able to discover any fairly recent
sales of comparable property in the area, the testimony would stand
as being consistent with the court's discretionary prerogative and not
an abuse of its discretion to admit evidence.
4 2
Sellers v. Public Savings Life Insurance Co. 43 involved a charge,
in an action by the insured's widow, beneficiary of a life insurance
policy, that the jury might infer, from failure of insurer to call a witness
who was with the insured at the time shortly before his accidental
death, that that party's testimony probably would have been adverse.
The insured drowned accidentally and the factual issue involved
was whether the deceased had been under the influence of any intoxicat-
ing stimulants at the time of his death, sufficient cause for release from
liability of the insurance company. The insurance company failed to
call the one individual last known to be with the deceased before the
accident. As a result, the court charged that from this the jury could
infer that had that witness been called the testimony would probably
be unfavorable to the insurer.
In reversing the lower court decision and allowing a new trial, the
court pointed out that the fallacy in the lower court's reasoning regard-
ing the failure of the insurer to call the witness in question was that
the witness was as available to the widow as to the insurer and there
was no evidence to suggest that the insurer had any degree of control
over that witness.
South Carolina Highway Department v. Nasim" concerned a land
condemnation case. The attorney for the condemnee made such fla-
grant and prejudicial remarks in his argument to the jury following
culmination of evidence that the attorney for the highway department
moved for a new trial following an adverse verdict. The trial court
refused this motion for a new trial, because it was offered too late.
42. Id. at 369, 175 S.E.2d at 396, the Court states: "Admission or exclusion of
evidence is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and in the absence
of a clear abuse of such discretion, amounting to error of law, his ruling will not be
disturbed."
43. 255 S.C. 251, 178 S.E.2d 241 (1970).
44. 179 S.E.2d 211 (S.C. 1971).
[Vol. 23
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The supreme court, in overturning the trial court's decision, stated
that the landowner's counsel's argument was so prejudicial that a new
trial was mandated albeit the objection was not interposed until after
the verdict. This case, however, should not be read too broadly. The
general rule states that objections must be made at the time of the
infraction, in this case when the attorney made his argument to the
jury. There is, however, within that rule an exception to the effect that
the timeliness of the objection becomes less significant as the severity
and prejudicial nature of the comments gain in force. Accordingly, the
court here held that the motion for a new trial should have been granted
because of the exceptional nature of the violation.
The argument involved the testimony of a former county agent
who was currently employed as a real estate broker. This individual
stated that, in his opinion, the worth of the property was far less than
what plaintiff had contended it to be worth. It was later, in plaintiff's
counsel's closing argument, that the alleged infraction transpired.
Counsel attacked the testimony as ridiculous and requested that the
Clerk of the Court should have returned the Bible to the witness when
he stated the figure so that the witness "could take his hand back off."
The counsel also, in a very thinly veiled manner, called the witness in
question a thief, underhanded and crooked.
In light of the aforementioned exception to the general rule, this
was grounds enough for a new trial and, ergo, not to be considered a
revamping of the general rule, but a case which does, in fact, clearly
reside within the exceptional language.
The final case in this area is Small v. Mungo5 involving a dis-
missal and nonsuit. The plaintiff and his counsel were present in court
on Monday morning, at which time cases listed on the trial roster were
called and ten cases were noted for jury trial ahead of plaintiff's litiga-
tion. Consequently, when the case was called for trial at 10:15 A.M.
Tuesday, the plaintiff and his counsel along with all their witnesses
were at work. The Clerk of Court reached counsel whose only reply was
that he could not appear until 2P.M.
The court immediately granted a dismissal on grounds of failure
to prosecute. Upon appeal, the supreme court upheld that decision as
within the discretion of the trial judge since unreasonable neglect was
45. 254 S.C. 438, 175 S.E.2d 802 (1970).
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inferable. The supreme court, however, did modify the dismissal so as
to delete the "with prejudice" entry.4"
VI. JURY
The only case touching upon this area, Gore v. Skipper," has to
do with the right of trial by jury. In this case, the pleadings admitted
that the corporate defendants were owners of land upon which the
plaintiffs alleged an easement or prescriptive right to the use of the
roads. The court held that, in such a situation, the action was not one
for recovery of money only or for specific real or personal property and
that the plaintiffs were not seeking legal relief, but only a mandatory
and prohibitory injunction. Therefore, the action was one in equity and
the trial judge did not violate the plaintiff's right to a trial by jury when
he granted a compulsory order of reference. 8
VII. JUDGMENT
A. Partial Summary Judgment
The one action to fall within this very unique procedural category
was also the case noted as the largest tort recovery in the history of
South Carolina, Mickle v. Blackmon."
The plaintiff in this action for personal injuries, resulting from an
automobile collision, was awarded $468,000 actual damages against
the defendant car dealer and $312,000 actual damages against the de-
fendant manufacturer. The latter, Ford Motor Company, however,
obtained a judgment non obstante veredicto from the trial judge and
both decisions were appealed.
46. S.C. CIR. CT. R. 86 provides that the arrangement of the trial and roster and
time set for trial of cases are binding on the litigants and their counsel and the trial judge
has authority to enforce compliance therewith. Further, the court in the instant case
placed the burden of proof with the plaintiff who was seeking to overturn the dismissal.
Such burden, according to the court, should include showing that the case was not
properly called or set down for trial in accordance with the circuit court rules and that
the plaintiff (petitioning party) could not reasonably have ascertained when the case
would be called.
47. 255 S.C. 18, 176 S.E.2d 569 (1970).
48. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1445 (4th ed. 195 1), defines reference as:
The act of sending a case pending in court to a referee for his examination
and decision.
49. 255 S.C. 136, 177 S.E.2d 548 (1970).
[Vol. 23
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Upon the initial appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court, the
decision against the defendant car dealer was affirmed and the judg-
ment was entered thereon. The judgment n.o.v. in favor of Ford was
reversed. The supreme court, however, at that appeal, due to faulty
instructions in the lower court regarding the manufacturer's duty in
the design of the automobile, remanded the case to the circuit court
and ordered a trial de novo as between plaintiff and defendant Ford.
Both defendants had requested a rehearing, but were denied and
remittitur was issued. Thereafter, in circuit court, the plaintiff moved
for "partial summary judgment" pursuant to Rule 44 of the Circuit
Court Rules requesting judgment as to damages leaving only the issue
of liability as to Ford remaining. The circuit court denied the motion
on the grounds that the supreme court's decision on the first appeal
demanded a complete new trial covering all the issues.
The plaintiff made a second appeal before the South Carolina
Supreme Court pursuant to the circuit court's denial of his motion for
partial summary judgment. Plaintiff argued that the defendant Ford
had had a fair and impartial trial as to damages thus setting up res
judicata, or estoppel, or law of the case, as to that issue actually
litigated, stating, in conclusion that Rule 44 "is a proper vehicle for
enforcing such principles.""0 The court, however, found this contention
lacking concluding that the mere occurence of a trial without benefit
of a judgment against Ford either as to liability or damages, did not
amount to res judicata, etc., without some former, outstanding deter-
mination of the issues relevant to the request for summary judgment.
B. Summary Judgment
Under this topic comes the case of Elmwood Cemetery v. South
Carolina Tax Commission.5 This case involved the payment of back
taxes by the Elmwood Cemetery Association (reportedly an eleemosy-
nary corporation), because they had lost their tax-free status when they
allegedly returned to certain stockholders a portion of the corpora-
tion's net earnings.
The back income tax was, according to the Tax Commission, due
since 1949. The respondent, Elmwood, paid the taxes due for 1949 and
50. 255 S.C. at 141, 177 S.E.2d at 549.
51. 179 S.E.2d 609 (S.C.1971).
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then, in accordance with the statutory provisions, sought a declaratory
judgment on all subsequent years along with a request to have refunded
the back tax money already paid. The court held that it had nojurisdic-
tion as to the declaratory judgment for the years after 1949, as the taxes
allegedly due for those years remained outstanding, and therefore, ju-
risdiction to render a decision regarding those years had not accrued.
Elmwood also moved for summary judgment as, they contended,
there remained no factual dispute and they were entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. In response to this motion, the supreme court felt
that the affidavit submitted in support of the motion (by plaintiff's
counsel to the effect that to his personal knowledge the cemetery was
and had been since 1949 a charitable corporation entitled to tax exemp-
tion) did not meet the standards necessary for summary judgment. The
court held that the affidavit did no more than restate the general allega-
tions in the complaint, and that it lent no evidentiary support to the




Two cases fell within the scope of this area. The first, Richardson
v. Williamson, 3 was an action for personal injuries resulting from an
automobile accident. The lower court, Aiken County's Court of Com-
mon Pleas awarded a directed verdict for the defendant and the plaintiff
appealed. The grounds stated for appeal were that the granting of the
directed verdict was improper as the evidence was sufficient to bring
the issues to trial and that, if as defendant alleged, there was no evi-
dence of actionable negligence on part of defendant, the proper motion
was for a nonsuit rather than a directed verdict.
The supreme court agreed fully with plaintiff's argument, further
stating that when considering whether a defendant is entitled to either
a nonsuit or a directed verdict, the evidence and all the inferences
reasonably deducible therefrom have to be viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.
The other case involving a directed verdict, Campbell v. Robbins
Tire and Rubber Co., Inc.,51 went one step further than the previous
52. See, CIR. CT. R. 44.
53. 181 S.E.2d 262 (S.C. 1971).
54. 182 S.E.2d 73 (S.C. 1971).
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case and said that where there is more than one reasonable inference
the case must go to the jury, but where the evidence is susceptible of
only one reasonable inference, the question is no longer one for the jury,
but one of law for the court.55
Campbell involved a personal injury sustained when the plaintiff
purchased a tire tube from co-defendant Kar Kare, Inc. which, upon
inflation, exploded injuring the plaintiff. The plaintiff, in his complaint,
alleged three things: (1) failure to inspect, (2) defect in the tube and (3)
failure to warn the plaintiff of the defect. The court, however, pointed
out that the plaintiff failed to prove his case, that he had not shown a
defect and that expert testimony established to the court's satisfaction
that there was no defect in the product.
The court concluded that since the plaintiff failed to prove his
allegations, there remained only the single inference that there was no
negligence on part of the defendants (distributor and/or manufacturer)
and that the motions for directed verdict should have been granted and
the defendant was entitled thereto as a matter of law.
IX. MISCELLANEOUS
The first case in this broad category, Smith v. Hawkins,56 involved
counsel's failure to appear at a judicial proceeding, although he had
due notice of the hearing. According to the supreme court's opinion,
counsel refused to appear (with no accompanying explanation) and as
a result, waived his right to cross-examine the adverse party's witnesses
who had properly appeared.
The remaining case likewise involved the actions of counsel. In this
case, Frist v. Leatherwood, Walker, Todd and Mann,57 the plaintiff had
retained the defendants to represent her in a divorce action. She was
granted a divorce, but denied alimony. Through her attorneys, (the
defendants in this action), she filed a notice of intent of appeal. There-
after, time expired for filing the appeal, and she commenced this action
55. See Still v. Blake, 255 S.C. 95, 177 S.E.2d 469 (1970). In the opinion filed
immediately preceeding the instant case, involving a question of contract and the statute
of frauds requirement therein, the court restated the same point. DeWitt v. Kelly, 182
S.E.2d 65, 66 (S.C. 1971) where the Court stated: "When evidence is susceptible of more
than one reasonable inference, the issues must be submitted to the jury."
56. 254 S.C. 423, 175 S.E.2d 824 (1970).
57. 433 F.2d 11 (4th Cir. 1970).
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for malpractice. The district court directed a verdict for the defendants
at the close of plaintiff's evidence. The time for appeal expired without
printing of the record. However, the attorney did everything necessary
to perfect the appeal up to the point of sending the record to the printer.
The main fault causing the expiration of time for appeal was with the
client-plaintiff who had failed to advance funds for the printing of the
record although repeated requests were made for her to do so.
X. CIRCUIT COURT RULES
A series of events occurred in this area to include some cases which
have already been surveyed, two cases to be discussed here and three
rule changes promulgated by the supreme court in August of 1970.
The first case, Perry v. Minit Saver Food Stores of South Caroli-
na, Inc.51 involved Rule 87. The defendant served upon the party plain-
tiff and his two brothers notice of depositions and paid only the broth-
ers' expenses as provided for under the "witness" provision of Rule 87.
The supreme court, thereafter, pursuant to plaintiff's motion, affirmed
the lower court's decision and forced defendant to make payment to
the plaintiff for his appearance at the deposition. The court expressed,
in its opinion, the new view that the word "witness" as intended by
the rule meant any witness whether perchance a party or not.
The second case, Hodge v. Myers," had to do with pretrial confer-
ences and an interpretation of Circuit Court Rule 43. This case was a
tort action where plaintiffs attorney requested certain admissions and
defendant's attorney objected. The Greenville Court of Common Pleas
ordered both plaintiff and defendant to provide the other with a list of
names and addresses of all persons known or reasonably believed to
have knowledge concerning the tortious event and any injuries involved.
The plaintiffs complied, and the defendants appealed the order.
The defendants argued that absent a rule providing for interrogatories,
the trial judge erred in deciding for plaintiffs. While the supreme court
recognized defendants argument as true, they stated that Rule 43 ap-
plies instead and that such discovery should be allowed under the Rule.
The court, in this opinion, construed Rule 43 very liberally.
"Since dockets must be kept current largely by settlements, litigants
58. 255 S.C. 42, 177 S.E.2d 4 (1970).
59. 180 S.E.2d 203 (S.C. 1971).
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and attorneys should be allowed liberal discovery. It would appear that
the trial judge concluded that the exchange of lists of potential wit-
nesses would help the parties in their quest of the whole truth."6
Under Circuit Court Rule 43 providing for pretrial conferences,
the judge and counsel may consider the "limitation of the number of
witnesses" 61 and the trial judge, as a matter of discretion, is entitled to
require the names and addresses of persons who have information
helpful to the disposition of the case. Counsel, according to the court's
interpretation of the rule, is likewise entitled to such information.
Therefore, according to this decision, the pretrial conference stage
vests in the trial judge a broad authority both inherent and under Rule
43, providing not only for the conference itself but also for any device
necessary to accomplish those things enumerated in the rule to expedite
the case.
The Circuit Court Rule revisions involved three rules: 44, 87 and
89. The revisions made are as follows:
First, 44. Paragraph (e) of Rule 44 was amended by adding the
following: "Any depositions taken may be opened by the Court and
considered relative to a motion under this Rule.
162
Second, 87. The following was added at the end of the first para-
graph of Section (A): "Depositions under this rule may be taken before
a Notary Public or any other officer authorized under the law of the
jurisdiction where taken to administer oaths."6" Further, in the second
paragraph after the second word "witness" and "(excluding a par-
ty)"." The third paragraph of Rule 87 was amended by adding after
the third word "any party or." 65 Also, the third paragraph was further
amended by adding the following: "Notice of the deposing of any party
or witness shall be given to each adversary party through counsel as
provided in G hereof."66
Third, 89. Paragraph (d) was added to Rule 89 and it reads:
60. Id. at 206.
61. Id. at 205.
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"Counsel for the requesting party shall endorse at the foot of the
written request the following or an equally inclusive certification: 'This
request is made in good faith; the subject hereof is genuinely relevant
to this case; and evidence of the subject hereof is necessary to the





Davis: Practice and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons, 1971
